A ‘poor safety culture; consequences, performance indicators and solutions – Looking at the consequences a poor or broken safety culture has on the effectiveness of the organization’s SMS can be done from two angles; a macro ‘birds eye’ and a micro ‘insiders’ point View. ‘The one universally accepted feature of culture is that its influence extends to all parts of an organization’ (Reason, 1998, IPPP), When looking at the macro effect Of a poor safety culture, it has to be identified that any poor culture will have an adverse effect on the organization’s management systems as a Whole.
When describing an effective SMS three core elements create its structure; its tools, processes and cultured. Fifth culture is flawed, or ineffective the two remaining elements can he deemed insignificant and even useless”. Subsequently the ROI (return on investment) on the company’s SMS investment may drop down to zero. From this general ‘birds eye’ perspective we conclude, that an SMS without a healthy safety culture is ‘an SMS that at best is marginalia and at worst, completely ineffective’ (Smith, 2010, up). It is the pervasive nature of culture that makes it uniquely suitable for creating ND sustaining the collinear gaps in defenses-in-depth through which an accident trajectory has to pass’ (Reason, 1998, IPPP), ‘A Broken Safety Culture is one in which safety standards are habitually relaxed to meet financial or time constraint, often characterized as reactive, complacent and dominated by unwarranted optimism’ (Van Dyke, 2006, app A app) As in any system these elements are interdependent.
As a general example a safety culture that has a poor reporting subculture can have excellent tools in place to facilitate reporting, it will simply only be used to TTS legal necessity thus rendering some of the risk mitigating processes baseless and ineffective, Prom a more focused vista a safety culture can be flawed in many ways. Each flaw having a different consequential effect on the SMS. One of the five cultural areas Of a safety culture is an informed culture.
A lack Of knowledge could Create a system in which it is not clear vat to report, how to identify safety hazards or What responsibilities each member has in the SMS. Another component is reporting culture. Safety Management Systems are highly data driven; “Quality safety data are the lifeblood Of safety management” (CIAO, 2009, 4-APP 2-1). Deficiencies in reporting culture results in a lack of data from the lower end of the Heimlich Pyramid, thus potentially having a system that misses 90% of safety data worthy events consequentially creating a foundations system.
The most essential component is just culture. At the heart of safety culture, a poor just culture can undermine the workforces trust in the system. Damaging the reporting culture due to tear of prosecution which in turn could lead to active covering up of hazardous events. Alternatively ‘A culture in which all acts are immune trot punishment would lack credibility in the eyes of the Rockford’ (Reason, 1998, pace). Finally the last two components are relatively interrelated when it comes to adverse effects on the SMS.
Deficiencies in flexible and learning culture’s result in a SMS that resists evolution, Generally this can be identified in calculative safety cultures where there is a lack of willingness to accept or to implement changes_ Due to the diversity of an organizational culture it is difficult to set a standard set of matrices and measurements to detect a poor safety culture. There are however, clear sings regarding the described components Of a safety culture that can indicate an unhealthy culture.
For instance a low amount of voluntary reports implicates a lacking reporting culture due to an imbalanced just culture or a poorly informed culture. This could cause a high reliance on other data submitting tools like flight data monitoring and mandatory air safety reports. A lack of actual safety budget or political backing for safety issues from senior management can indicate an absence of true commitment, trust or ‘buy-in’ at the top of the safety chain.
From a regulatory and 5 ‘Calculative organizations are hard to move because they are comfortable, even if they know that improvement is possible’ (Hudson, 2001, app) or even necessary. Giving the company a skewed, improper overview of its top risks, causing the system to only mitigate ‘easy’ to identify risks, public aspect a broken safety culture can be identified by a high number of unreported incidents, an CNN. ‘ere confidence in the safety of the operation and a general closed attitude to the press. When looking to improve an organization’s safety culture objectivity is required.
A gap analysis should be done through an extensive review of all cultural components. With a focus on finding the existing culture’s positive strengths creating pillars on which the cultural evolution can be built. Matching the culture, he company strategy and business model is the key to cultural change success. ‘Leaders should take care to honor their cultures strengths, focusing on changing just a few critical behaviors… ‘ (Setback, July-August 2012, Pl 13). Crucial in improving a safety culture is setting 3 correct safety climate.
A clear safety policy statement from the CEO should highlight management commitment, policies and Objectives. As part Of the improvement strategy, marketing strategies can be used to ensure difficult but crucial ‘buy-in’ from middle managements. Generally management Of change strategies for safety culture includes four key mints. 1) Creating awareness ensures a general increase in safety knowledge. 2) Carefully planning the change management in cooperation with the responsible managers. 3) Implement the action plans while ensuring a continuous review of the change model. ) Finally ensuring maintenance of the safety culture including ongoing safety culture surveys, LOSS audits and toolkits like Safety Culture organizational Review Evaluation (SCORPIO). Effects to airline business models and regional cultures on safety culture – Each organizational culture is unique, formed by the different pressures, business haves and subcultures. Airlines with a ‘low-cost’ model are generally highly revenue 7 The CEO, the safety ‘champ’ and the workforce, themselves make up the different forces acting on and within the five components of a safety culture.
It is important that the workforce at large perfectly understands how a solid SMS System influences the company’s performance and thereby guarantees the continued existence of employment. It is equally important that the workforce understands how culture influences the outcome Of the SMS. This process Of “making to understand” is uniquely the responsibility of the CEO. 3 Link safety values to the core business, and show tangible evidence for their impact, such as how safety can enhance production. Efficiency, communication and even cost benefits’ (GAIN working Group E, 2004, app).
Safety Culture Organizational Review Evaluation SCORE, a diagnostic tool developed by BEANIES SIMMONS used to measure safety culture and risk tolerance of an organization driven. ROI can in such a model be a strong driver of safety culture. One of the clear benefits of a strong safety culture is that it can facilitate a higher operational performance. Once a clear return on investment to safety culture an he identified the dynamic environment usually associated with ‘low- cost’ business models can give a catalyst effect to the evolution of the safety culture.
The generally larger size of ‘low-cost’ airlines creates a Nan-personal environment, usually associated with a point-to-point operational model. Even though this allows for confidentiality in the system an impersonal environment creates dependence on systems rather than people like a ‘safety champion’13. Network Carriers with a ‘legacy business model historically have an organization culture with a strong emphasis on quality management.
Due to the overlap and molarities in quality management and safety management the established quality paths facilitate the evolution of the safety culture. Legacy carries generally hue strongly developed informed, just and reporting cultures due to their historical value and in-house experience. The long history and academic heritage that a legacy airline generally has can also prove to be a flaw in the safety culture having an effect on the ability to adapt and evolve creating deficiencies in the flexible and learning cultures.
As identified in ‘IOW- cost’ business models the large size of ‘Legacy’ business models can mean impediment for the evolution of the safety cultures. Organizations with a ‘regional’ business model share the same benefits of a strong quality culture as those in a legacy model. The regularly smaller size of the ‘regional’ model allows for a direct personal approach to safety culture, The safety champion has a very large and effective influence on the evolution of the safety culture 6. The There is considerable evidence that the most safety-minded companies are also amongst the most profitable’ (Hudson, 2001, app) Senior management can rely on the strength of the safety culture and thus can SSH towards a higher performance limit without degrading the safety of the operation 13 Many subcultures or ‘silos’ are allowed to exist and can have a strong influence on the safety culture, thus a strong safety climate is required. Quality paths include established quality management systems and a Strong established quality culture. Large organizations will inevitably be heavily calculative unless active steps are taken to counter that tendency’ (Hudson, 2001, app). Confidentiality issues could undermine the just culture in a smaller ‘regional’ organization. There is a necessity to emphasize on trust in the safety system and he colleagues operating safety system greatest single barrier to success tort smaller organizations however, is the belief that it is too difficult’ (Hudson, 2001 , app) this is due to smaller revenue margins and resources.
Next to historical cultural shapers like important safety events, cultural safety influences include hierarchal cultures and general working ethics. General national cultural safety and compliance acceptability accommodate the development and evolution of a strong safety culture 7. With increasing trends in society when it comes to litigating, compensation ultras and judicial activism, aviation legal constructs have become more and more paramount.
An interesting example of adapting to these society trends is the use of the Dutch ‘bolder model’ in the Netherlands. The VENIN has a key role in scrutinizing the Dutch airlines as to their true commitment and ability to protect their employees when it comes to legal liability. Assuring an ideal climate for healthy safety cultures to exist. By creating a legal framework protecting the workforce against prosecution western culture facilitates just and reporting cultures.
Legal cultures lacking framework, and legislation can create distrust amongst the workforce out of fear of corporate or legal prosecution. However due to the unique nature different safety culture it is not advisable to try to legislate for specific factors like safety culture measuring indices and safety culture related performance indicators. Rather it is more desirable to legislate for the existence of safety culture and its legal protection.
Creating a fence like framework identifying the need for the development of a positive safety climate allowing the culture to evolve, It is this line that both the CIAO Shared values and beliefs that interact with an organization’s structures and intro systems to produce behavioral norms’ (Tall, 1983 cited in Reason, 1998, IPPP) 18 Preserving van Netherlands Everlastingness, Dutch Airline Pilots Association, Pilots Union forming an independent knowledgeable member in the Dutch aviation ‘Bolder model’. 9 Western law generally relies on a legal fence work made up Of corporations, contracts, collective working agreements, employee rights and recognized union powers. Whereas Other legal cultures could lack such protective Structures. ‘Global adaptation Of a single, common safety or just culture could therefore be noninsured discriminatory, perhaps even judgmental, if the local culture is not the same’ (CIAO, 2009, 2-30) 21 Legislation should also include the need for continual maintenance and revision of the safety culture.
SIMMS and EASE GM are generally keeping when it comes to safety culture as a part of the safety management system. Conclusion ? Safety culture can be the driving mechanism of an organizations safety management apparatus, ensuring that the investments in SMS are equal or larger than the compass overall benchmark ROI. Future trends for the development of SMS will have a great focus on SMS as a facilitator and protector f the organizations generative safety culture (App figure 1). Does a poor safety culture make the safety management system vulnerable to complete failure?